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Attorneys for John Nikols
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN NIKOLS
Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.

Case No. 20080503-CA

GOODMAN & CHESNOFF, a Nevada
Corporation, and DAVID Z.
CHESNOFF,
Defendants and Appellees.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-103(2)(j) (2008)
because this case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court. The Honorable John Paul
Kennedy, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, enlered Judgment
denying Appellant's Motion for Discharge of Writ of Attachment on April 29, 2008.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW; PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Did John Nikols establish that he held the four Murray properties in a
purchase money resulting trust where they were titled in his son's name?

I

ndard of Review: The court will not disturb a trial court's findings of fact
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against it in reviewing the creation of a
purchase money result.

r fr

* ist. In Re Estate of Hock, 0!n I1 i d I I I I I I I I (I I'll.iili I1'!1! ')

Preservation'

I Inr '\pprlhnl 'irpiH ffmf thr mtcnl of the trustee is

irrelevant to the creation of a purchase money resulting trust, in which the intent of the
grantor is determinative,, R. 2953: 126 (15- 19).
Issue 21 1 "' :| il 1 "
aftei it conditioner

' '• '•

• in imposing an adverse inference against John Nikols

i .Nikols' testimony upon a waiver of his privilege against self

incrimination?
Standard of Review: Questions :>f la \ ' - are re\ iewed for c :)i rectness State \ ,
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
Preservation: Counsel for Appellant objected to the court's r uling that J olin

against self incrimination. R. 2953: 118-19.
Issue 3: Did the district court err in drawing an adverse inference against j^lut
1" likols \* iien A ppellee Che snoff • :hose not t sstif^ in si ipp • DI I; :)l

-3

relied on the title to secure payment and that John was also a debtor?
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Harmon, 910

Preservation: Counsel for Appellant told the Court she welcomed Mr. Chesnoff s
testimony regarding conversations he had with John Nikols and that it was not her

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4, Utah Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, and Utah Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6 are in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Chesnoff obtained a judgment against Michael Nikols for unpaid
attorney fees. As a creditor of Michael Nikols, Mr. Chesnoff cannot attach property titled
in Michael's name but owned by Michael's father, Appellant John Nikols. The Court
found John established a purchase money resulting trust, based on his testimony and
evidence he made the mortgage payments and incurred all other obligations. The Court
erred, however in ruling that, John's prima facie case alone, with no evidence presented
to the contrary, was overruled by two adverse inferences against him for failing to
"produce" witnesses he was under no obligation to present. The Court erred in allowing
those inferences to serve as a substitute for affirmative evidence of Mr. Chesnoff s
claims. These inferences against John, without corroborative evidence supporting Mr.
Chesnoff s defenses, were insufficient to override John Nikols evidence of a resulting
trust in his favor.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Properties Mr. Chesnoff Attached
John Nikols, a Greek immigrant, established Coachman's Restaurant at 1301
South State Street when he purchased the land in 1975. R. 2953: 45 (1-2). The 1301
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South State Street property has been titled in John Nikols' name for its entire existence
and in its 33 years has become a fixture in Salt Lake City. l R. 302, Exhibit A.
To further invest in real estate, in 1978 John Nikols purchased a plot of land facing
State Street at 4338 South ("the primary property"). R. 2953: 53 (6-7); 88 (9-16). The
primary property has also been titled in his name since its existence. R: 2953: 99 (18-21).
Abutting properties to the primary property later came for sale. R. 2953: 90 (12-15). In
1988 and 1994 John purchased four lots adjoining his primary property to establish a
larger, more valuable investment. R. 2953: 90-91. These four properties ("the four
Murray properties") are the subject of this appeal.
The first addition came in 1988 when John purchased three adjoining lots to the
primary property.2 R. 2953: 58-59; P. 89 (14-23). At his realtor's suggestion, John titled
these first three properties to his son, Michael Nikols, because he wanted to secure an
immediate purchase and was not sure of the status of outstanding judgments against him.
R. 2953: 60 (1-19); 76 (3-18); 90 (3-7); 97 (7-9). The second addition came in 1994
when John purchased the fourth adjoining lot, also titling it in Michael's name.3 R. 2953:
60 (1 -19), He did so for continuity and ease.
The Encumbrance
The four Murray properties became encumbered on November 18, 2004 when
Michael Nikols was indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and one
John Nikols' residence at 2256 Lakeline Circle also has been titled in his name since he
purchased it in 1976. R. 2953: 51 (1-6); 105: (16-18).
2
These properties are located at 71 East 4340 South, 85 East Edison Avenue, and 75 East
Edison Avenue. R. 2953: 51; 105.
The fourth property is located at 72 East Fireclay Avenue.
4

count of possession of one or more firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. R.
800, Attachment 4. The indictment included a notice of intent to seek criminal forfeiture
of real and personal property titled in Michael's name. IcL The federal government's
seizure included the Coachman's Restaurant at 1301 South State Street and the four
Murray properties. The government also attached Michael's residence at 1402 West Van
Buren Avenue in Salt Lake City, which he purchased in approximately 2001. Id.
Michael retained Mr. Ron Yengich as counsel. R. 532: Attachment B fl[ 6). Mr.
Yengich did extensive work on Michael's case, filing numerous motions. After his
extensive work on Michael's case, the Court discharged Mr. Yengich on June 2, 2005 for
a conflict of interest based on the government's claim that it intended to offer one of Mr.
Yengich's former clients a reduced sentence for providing information against Michael.
R. 532: Attachment B fl[ 7). His discharge came just three months before Judge Cassell's
firm final change of plea deadline of September 27, 2005. R. 355: (f 4).
The Initial Consultation with Mr. Chesnoff
To replace Mr. Yengich, Michael hired Las Vegas attorney David Chesnoff.
Michael and his father, John Nikols, initially met with Mr. Chesnoff in his Las Vegas
office on or about July 2, 2005 (the "initial consultation"). R. 355: fl[ 2). During the
initial consultation John and Michael made it clear that the forfeiture aspect of the case
was critical because John owned the Murray properties. R. 2953: 3-9. John explained to
Mr. Chesnoff that the Coachman's was titled in John's name and Michael had never had
any ownership interest in Coachman's, that John had titled all four Murray properties in
Michael's name as an asset protection strategy, and that Michael never paid for them and
5

never had actual control of them. R. 2953: 95 (5-13). At this meeting, Mr. Chesnoff told
Michael and John that the forfeiture claims could be easily addressed and that he would
hire forfeiture expert to dispose of the forfeiture claims. R. 532: Attachment A fl[ 10).
For his services, Mr. Chesnoff charged Michael Nikols a nonrefundable flat fee of
$350,000. The parties did not discuss whether the fee would be adjusted if Michael's case
did not go to trial. R. 532: Attachment B flf 10). John Nikols emphasized to Mr.
Chesnoff that clearing the Coachman's Restaurant of the government's lis pendens was a
priority because John needed to borrow against the Coachman's to pay Mr. Chesnoff s
fees until Michael could pay him back. R. 996, Exhibit A: 4 (f 1, 2).
Mr. Chesnoff s Representation
Before Michael Nikols accepted a plea, Mr. Chesnoff appeared three times. His
first and second court appearances in Michael's case were at status conferences on July
15 and September 29, 2005. R. 639, Attachment F; R. 421, Exhibit C. On October 6,
2005, Mr. Chesnoff attended a Court hearing to discuss Michael's detention. R. 996,
Exhibit 2. During his appearances, Mr. Chesnoff, as an officer of the court, told the
Honorable Paul Cassell that the property attached to the government's claim was not
Michael Nikols' and that no portion of Michael's drug proceeds had been used to pay for
the land. R. 421, Exhibit C: 6 (13-21); R.996.
On October 18, 2005, three months after Mr, Chesnoff filed his appearance,
Michael pled guilty to count 1 of the Indictment. R. 800, Exhibit 6: 18. That day he was
sentenced to seventy (70) months custody. Id. The settlement required him to pay a
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$200,000 judgment in lieu of the government's foreclosure of the properties identified in
the forfeiture claims. R. 800, Exhibit 7.
Post-Plea Events
On his son's behalf, John Nikols paid the $200,000 forfeiture settlement to clear
his properties even though he was under no legal obligation to do so. R. 1957: 6 (f f, g).
The Government then released the lis pendens on all six of the real properties. R. 800,
Exhibit 7. However, the $200,000 was returned to John and the lis pendens was
reinstated on the properties on October 16, 2006 when the federal court granted
Michael's petition to withdraw his plea. Michael's criminal case is currently pending
trial.
Mr. Chesnoff s Current Collection Suit
Mr. Chesnoff and his firm filed suit on December 9, 2005 against Michael Nikols
seeking $190,000 in legal fees he had not received toward his $350,000 flat fee. R.l.
Three days later, Mr. Chesnoff motioned for a prejudgment writ of attachment on six
parcels of property, including the Coachman's Restaurant, which he had actual notice
was not titled in Michael's name. R. 27. The following day, Mr. Chesnoff filed a new
motion for prejudgment attachment, this time requesting that it be ex parte. R. 39.
Michael answered and counterclaimed on January 20, 2005. R. 107. John Nikols
commenced his own action against Mr. Chesnoff and his firm alleging malpractice with
respect to his handling of the forfeiture claim. R. 133. The two cases were consolidated.
R.157.

7

On summary judgment, the Court found that Michael was Mr. Chesnoff s debtor
for the outstanding amount and that there was no basis for John's claims since there was
no attorney-client relationship between John and Mr. Chesnoff. R. 1957: 4-6. The
Court's order made four relevant findings: first, Michael entered into a retainer
agreement for $350,000 with Mr. Chesnoff and owed the principal amount of $190,000 to
Mr. Chesnoff; second, that there was a dispute of actual ownership regarding the
properties and further discovery was required; third, there was no attorney-client
relationship between Mr. Chesnoff and John; and fourth, the $200,000 settlement in lieu
of forfeiture on the four Murray properties "was against Michael only, and John was not
obligated to pay the $200,000 judgment, nor was he a party to the plea agreement." R.
1957: 4-6.
After obtaining summary judgment, Mr. Chesnoff sought to execute the writ of
attachment and satisfy his judgment against the four Murray properties. R. 2041-43. John
Nikols opposed execution of the writ, arguing that he created a purchase money resulting
trust as owner of the properties. R 2953: 126.
Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing, John Nikols restated his claim of ownership. He
explained exactly how he found and purchased the properties and why the properties
were titled in his son's name. R. 2953: 58-59; 89 (14-23). Michael Nikols proffered that
he was prepared to testify that the properties were not a gift to him but indicated that he
would assert his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination if questioned about
matters relating to his pending criminal trial. R. 2953: 118-19. Mr. Chesnoff argued that
8

he could not fully cross examine Michael and impeach his credibility if he was unable to
ask him about facts underlying the pending criminal charges. R. 2953: 142 (18-21). The
Court agreed and held that Michael would not be permitted to testify about the
conveyance in 1988 and 1994 unless he waived his Fifth Amendment privilege and
responded to questions about the pending criminal charges. R. 2953: 120 (3-8). Michael
Nikols declined to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and proffered his deposition
testimony taken by Mr. Chesnoff s counsel. R. 2953: 120(9). The Court declined to
accept the deposition based upon the representation of Mr. Chesnoff s counsel that the
deposition was inadequate. R. 2953: 117 (13-15). John Nikols then submitted his case
on the evidence he presented.
Instead of presenting evidence to rebut John Nikols' evidence, Mr. Chesnoff s
counsel stated that if Mr. Chesnoff testified Michael's attorney-client privilege would be
waived and his testimony would adversely effect Michael's criminal case. R. 2953: 117
(2-7); R. 2953: 129 (8-11); R. 2953: 155 (10-20). Michael also refused to waive his
attorney-client privilege about privileged communications he had had with Mr. Chesnoff
about his criminal case. R. 2953. Mr. Chesnoff did not take the stand to testify regarding
discussions between himself and John Nikols. R. 2953.
The Court found John met his burden but allowed the improper adverse inferences
- and nothing more - to eliminate John's prima facie showing:
"I'm troubled by the fact that it appears that, at least from one side of the
testimony, that John Nikols has invested his money in buying these properties and
that he's claimed that he's regarded them as his properties ... I mean, I don't — I
don't think that you win just by presenting the prima facie case."

9

R.2953: 152-53.
The Court's final order included, in part, the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:4
John Nikols and his son both expressed their desire that David Chesnoff not
testify regarding the issues before the Court, including issues of credibility
of John and Michael Nikols. R. 2930.
Michael Nikols' refusal to testify and the opposition of Michael and John
Nikols to the testimony of David Chesnoff were prejudicial to the ability of
Chesnoff to be able to present his position in this matter in a full and
complete manner. R. 2930.
John Nikols has not presented testimony from available and knowledgeable
witnesses (Michael Nikols and David Chesnoff) to support his claim
regarding the existence of a resulting trust in his favor regarding the Murray
properties. R. 2930.
The Court therefore presumes that the testimony of Michael Nikols and
David Chesnoff, had it been presented, would have been adverse to the
claims of John Nikols regarding the purported resulting trust. R. 2930.
The Court concludes that John Nikols failed to meet his burden of
establishing that a resulting trust existed with respect to the Murray
properties. R. 2930.
John Nikols commenced this appeal shortly thereafter. R. 2930.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
John Nikols conclusively showed a resulting trust in his favor by establishing that
he intended to retain the beneficial interest in the property and by showing he was both
benefitted and burdened by the land. Any intent to avoid his creditors when the resulting
trusts were created in 1988 and 1994 does not eliminate his current equitable interest in
Counsel for Mr. Chesnoff submitted a proposed order to which John Nikols submitted
objections.
10

the properties - it only allows his creditors as of that time to pierce his interest. Michael
Nikols' creditors cannot reach what is owned by Michael's father.
The Court erred in drawing an adverse inference against John Nikols based upon
Michael Nikols' failure to testify. The Court erroneously conditioned Michael's
testimony on a complete waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
in an unrelated criminal case to permit opposing counsel to impeach his credibility. Mr.
Chesnoff s counsel could have questioned Michael about his involvement in the transfer
of title and his father's intent without questioning him about his involvement in drug
dealing and communications made to Mr. Chesnoff regarding that case. Moreover, Rules
608 and 609 of the Rules of Evidence prohibited Mr. Chesnoff from cross-examining
Michael Nikols about the facts underlying the federal drug and firearm charges.
It was error to draw an adverse inference against John based upon Mr. Chesnoff s
failure to testify unless he could divulge harmful, privileged communications that were
irrelevant to John Nikols' representations to Mr. Chesnoff regarding payment to him.
Mr. Chesnoff could have attempted to establish these claims against John Nikols without
violating his attorney client privilege with Michael Nikols. Mr. Chesnoff could not have
relied on the properties' bare title as a surety because at the time the fee agreement was
signed he had actual notice of John's claim of ownership and that the property was
encumbered by the federal government's criminal forfeiture action. In addition, Michael
Nikols - not John Nikols - was Mr. Chesnoff s debtor as evidenced by the plain language
of the fee agreement, the absence of any written guarantee and the Court's prior order
finding that John was not the debtor. The Court erred in imposing an adverse inference
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against John Nikols where there was no logical expectation that John would produce Mr.
Chesnoff as a witness to establish his claim John Nikols had no obligation to call Mr.
Chesnoff to the stand to permit Chesnoff an opportunity to establish his defenses.
ARGUMENT
APPELLEE DAVID CHESNOFF CANNOT ATTACH PROPERTY TITLED IN HIS DEBTOR
MICHAEL NIKOLS' NAME WHERE HE FAILED TO OVERCOME EVIDENCE
APPELLANT JOHN NIKOLS PRESENTED ESTABLISHINGTHAT HE HELD A RESULTING
TRUST IN THE PROPERTY-

John Nikols established that he retained a purchase money resulting trust in the
beneficial interest of the four Murray properties when he put its legal title in his son's
name. The Court erred in applying an adverse inference against him, overcoming this
evidence without evidence to the contrary, simply because he did not call more than one
witness and because Appellee Chesnoff chose not to testify on his own behalf.
The district Court erred in three ways. First, it erred in concluding that John Nikols
failed to establish a purchase money resulting trust in his favor in the land titled in his
son's name. Second, it erred in assigning an adverse inference against John Nikols after it
conditioned Michael Nikols' testimony on a wavier of his right against self incrimination
in the pending criminal case Finally, it erred in drawing an adverse inference against John
Nikols when Appellee Chesnoff chose not to rebut John Nikols' evidence by testifying in
support of his two claims.
Because the four Murray Properties are held by John Nikols in a purchase money
resulting trust, Appellee Chesnoff cannot reach them to satisfy the judgment he obtained
against John's son Michael.

12

I.

JOHN NIKOLS ESTABLISHED THAT HE HELD THE PROPERTIES IN A
PURCHASE MONEY RESULTING TRUST.
The Court erred in finding John Nikols did not establish a purchase money

resulting trust where the evidence showed he intended to retain the equitable interest and
was at all times both benefitted and burdened by the land.
When a parent pays consideration for land but titles it to his child, the courts
presume that the conveyance was a gift. John Nikols conclusively rebutted this legal
presumption by showing a resulting trust in his favor in two ways. First, he established
that he intended to retain the beneficial interest in the property since the date of purchase.
Second, he showed he was both benefitted and burdened by the land. Any intent to avoid
his creditors when the resulting trusts were created in 1988 and 1994 does not eliminate
John's current equitable interest in the property - it only allows his creditors as of that
time to pierce his interest. Michael Nikols' creditors cannot reach what is owned by
Michael's father.
A. JOHN NIKOLS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT HE INTENDED TO RETAIN THE BENEFICIAL
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
A resulting trust is created where one disposes of property under circumstances
that suggest that he does not intend for the titleholder to have the beneficial interest in the
property. Likewise, a purchase money resulting trust is implied where one person pays
for the purchase of land but titles it in the name of another. Hock's Estate, 655 P.2d at
1115.
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A sufficient showing that one other than legal titleholder paid purchase price for
property makes prima facie case that beneficial ownership rests in the payor. Hocking v.
Hocking, 394 N.E. 2d 653, 657 (111. App. Ct. 1979). It is undisputed that John Nikols paid
for the four Murray properties Mr. Chesnoff seeks to execute. R. 996, Exhibit 2: 23-24;
R. 421, Exhibit C: 16(13-21); R. 2953: 140(18-21); R. 2953: 40-41.
John Nikols conclusively established the critical element of establishing a
purchase money resulting trust by showing he intended to retain ownership of the land.
When a parent pays consideration for land but titles it to his child, the courts presume that
the conveyance was a gift. See, e.g.. In Re Clemens, 472 F.2d 939, 943 (6th Cir. 1972).
This presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
intended to retain the equitable interest in the property. Id; See also Hock's Estate, 655
P.2d at 1114 (to establish a resulting trust the evidence must be clear and convincing).
When this presumption is rebutted, the beneficial interest of the property is held in trust
for the payor (the parent) from the time of the original conveyance. Wilson v. St. Clair,
286 S.W. 2d 554, 556 (1955); Hocking, 394 N.E. 2d at 657. This is true even if his
purpose was to avoid judgments against him. Hicks v. Lindell, 573 P.2d 716, 717-720
(Okla. App. 1977); See_also Hocking, 394 N.E. 2d at 658.
John Nikols intended to, and did, remain the equitable owner of the properties
even though they were titled in his son's name. T. 2953: 106 (22-25). John has owned
the primary property facing State Street for 30 years. He was trying to expand that lot.
When abutting lots came for sale, he bought them to expand his investment. R. 2953: 5859; 89 (14-23). His intent to expand a lot that was already titled in his name
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demonstrates his intent to retain ownership in the newly-acquired, contiguous four
Murray properties.
The presumption of a gift is rebutted if there is evidence that the parent's intent
was to retain the property for his own future security, for estate planning purposes, or
titled it in his child's name at a bank official's suggestion. Clemens, 472 F.2d at 944
(parent's intent to secure property for future security sufficient to establish resulting
trust); In re Moodie, 362 B.R. 554, 560 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (parents' intent to ease
estate planning sufficient for resulting trust); Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 359 A.2d 631,
632, 634 (N.H. 1976) (resulting trust created in favor of parents when they placed the title
in joint tenancy at a bank official's suggestion). John Nikols testified at the Evidentiary
Hearing that he titled the property in his son's name as an asset protection strategy to
ensure a quick purchase where he may have had outstanding judgment liens and to
maintain consistency thereafter. T. 2953: 60 (12-13). He stated: "The only intent was to
secure the properties that day. And did not have no problem to put it on my — on
Michael's name. And it was, like I says, it was a suggestion of one of the realtors there."
T. 2953: 91-92; 106 (14-16) (22-25).
John Nikols also testified at the evidentiary hearing that he and Michael discussed
the arrangement in detail:
"I said, 'Listen, I have to buy this property' — they knew all the time I needed
those properties. I needed them for the first property — the front property. So I
said, 'You've got a technicality there that it's a lien right now against it.' He
knows (inaudible) today I had to put it on somebody's name. I said, 'I want to put
it on your — your name.' And is there any objection? He said, 'No. I have no
objections whatsoever.'"
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Id. In an affidavit to the Court, John Nikols likewise stated:
"When I purchased the four Murray properties, I was concerned they might be
subject to a judgment lien. As an asset protection strategy, I therefore had the
properties titled in Michael's name. Before closing on the four properties I
explained to Michael that they were not a gift and that I did not intend for Michael
to own or control these properties . . . They have never been used by Michael and
Michael always understood that I was the true owner of such properties."
R. 996: 9 f 35. See also R. 2953: 106 (6-9). At all times, Michael Nikols understood he
held only the legal title. R. 1824:1f 6.
John Nikols also rebutted the presumption that he intended to give the property as
a gift by showing that he routinely placed his property in Michael Nikols' name. The
Supreme Court of Montana held that a father clearly and convincingly established that a
gift was not intended where he and his son established a practice where the father placed
his property in son's name and his son quitclaimed it back to him after the property was
sold. Hilliard v. Hilliard, 844 P.2d 54, 58 (Mont. 1992); See also Walker v. Hooker, 667
S.W. 2d 637, 641-44 (Ark. 1984); Hocking, 394 N.E.2d at 658 (parents established a
purchase money resulting trust where they routinely titled their land in their children's
names to avoid foreclosure and for estate planning purposes).
It is irrelevant that John Nikols may have titled the property in his son's name to
ensure it would not be encumbered by his creditors. In fact, this evidence can further
support that he did not intend to give the property as a gift. See Wilson, 286 S.W. 2d at
557; See also Hicks, 573 P.2d at 720; See also Hocking, 394 N.E. 2d at 658. For
example, where a father named his daughter as a beneficiary of the real estate to insulate
himself from his business partner's creditors, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that he
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did not intend to give him the property interest as that kind of transaction frequently
occurred. Pratt v. Watson, 559 N.E. 2d 280, 282 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
John Nikols' intent to shield his newly-acquired land from his then-existing
creditors makes this case analogous to Pratt and Hocking. The evidence showed that John
Nikols intended to retain his ownership interest and that this kind of transaction occurred
frequently among John Nikols and his son, just like in Clemens and Hilliard. Also, at all
times Michael Nikols understood that the conveyance was business related and not a gift,
as in Pratt.
B. EVIDENCE THAT JOHN NIKOLS WAS BOTH BURDENED AND
BENEFITTED BY THE PROPERTY REBUTTED ANY PRESUMPTION
THE PROPERTY WAS A GIFT TO HIS SON.
Michael Nikols never received the benefits or shouldered the burdens of the four
Murray properties. Courts will evaluate which party encountered the land's benefits and
burdens in determining whether the parent intended to retain the beneficial interest in the
property or whether the property was a gift.
The intent of the grantor is evidenced by whether he suffered the burdens of the
land. Evidence the parent negotiated the purchase price, paid the down payment, paid the
mortgage payments, paid the real estate taxes, insurance and maintenance costs of the
property rebuts the presumption of a gift. Clemens, 472 F.2d at 944; Hilliard, 844 P.2d at
58; Hocking, 394 N.E. 2d at 657-58. John Nikols admitted into evidence checks from his
personal account for the mortgage payment and testified that he paid the property taxes
every year from the same account. T. 2953, Defense Exhibit 1; T. 2953: 23-24; 77 (7-11);
92 (17); 93 (6-15); 108 (11-22). John Nikols also maintained the property, such as
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paying for and erecting a fence around the property. T. 2953: 109 (2-6). Michael Nikols
encountered none of these obligations. Only John Nikols was burdened by the properties.
Courts will also evaluate who benefitted from the property when determining if
the parent intended his child to have beneficial interest in the land. Evidence the child
did not collect rents or claim any income from the property on his income taxes rebuts the
presumption of a gift. Clemens, 472 F.2d at 944 (resulting trust created in favor of a
mother who included the income from the property on her income taxes). For example,
where a father wanted to assure himself the income from a rental property, reported the
rents on his tax returns, and improved and operated the apartment house on the land, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held he created a purchase money resulting trust. Wilson, 286
S.W. 2d 554, 555-57; Moodie, 362 B.R. at 561 (a purchase money resulting trust existed
for a mother's benefit where she was the only party who paid for the property, the
daughter never received any benefit from the transaction, daughter never believed she
had any ownership in property, and never received any proceeds from the sale).
John Nikols retained possession of the four Murray properties and collected the
rents. R. 2953: 109 (16-18). As in HiUiard, John Nikols located the properties, negotiated
for their purchase, paid for them and all their improvements, collected rents, paid the
taxes and maintenance, and treated the property as his own by taking exclusive
possession and using it for his business endeavors. Id. Michael Nikols, on the other hand,
bore none of the expenses and received none of the benefits, as in HiUiard and Prange.
Just like Moodie, John was the only party who paid for the property; Michael neither
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received any benefit or burden from the transaction nor believed he had any ownership in
property.
C. ANY INTENT TO AVOID HIS CREDITORS WHEN THE RESULTING
TRUST WAS CREATED DOES NOT ELIMINATE JOHN NIKOL'S
EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY - IT ONLY ALLOWS
HIS CREDITORS AT THAT TIME TO REACH IR.
It is irrelevant to this action that John Nikols may have intended to avoid his
creditors when he titled the land to Michael because that act would have only allowed his
personal creditors to reach the property he held in trust. When A conveys his property to
B in order to avoid A's creditors, A's creditors at that time can benefit from the property
conveyed. 23 Bogerts Trusts and Trustees § 463. A retains a trust to the equitable
interest in the remainder of the property conveyed. Id.; Cowles v. Cowles, 131 N.W. 738,
738 (Neb. 1911).
A judgment lien attaches only to the:
"actual interest the judgment debtor has in real property when the judgment is
obtained and recorded. . . However, a debtor retaining bare legal title has no
property 'interest' to which a judgment lien could attach . . . Thus, 'a judgment
creditor of a debtor holding bare legal title to property cannot attach the equitable
interest in the property, as it is vested in another/"
Capital Assets Financial Services v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1998) (internal
citations omitted). Under this rationale, the creditors of the payor can proceed against the
property on the theory that the debtor is the equitable owner. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating
v. Neeley Const. Co, 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984). For example, where a family
corporation enters a purchase contract, makes a down payment and deeds the land to
another family corporation after it incurs a judgment by one of its creditors, the first
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family corporation retained a purchase money resulting trust in the land and its creditors
could attach its equitable interest. Id.
Creditors of the title holder, on the other hand, cannot reach the property in the
trust because the title holder does not have any beneficial interest in the property.
Hergenreter v. Sommers, 535 S.W.2d 513, 518-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Bare legal title,
without any beneficial interest, leaves nothing to which a judgment lien can attach. Lund
v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1983). For example, where daughters were the
equitable owners of real estate titled in their parents' name, the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Kansas City District, held that the property could not be sold in execution of a
judgment against their parents. Hergenreter, at 518-20. In Hergenreter, the evidence
showed it was understood that the parents took title to the real estate and held it for their
daughters' benefit. Id. at 518. The Court found a purchase money resulting trust was
established for their daughters, whom paid the earnest money, the down payment, and
payments for the deed of trust. IcL at 520.
Only an injured creditor at the time can attack a fraudulent conveyance. In
Woodward v. Funderbunk, Larry Funderburk bought land and conveyed the deed to his
son, Jason, because the Mississippi State Tax Commission had recovered a judgment
against him. 846 So. 2d 363, 365 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). Later, a judgment was entered
against Jason, the title holder and Larry's son. Id Larry, as Jason's power of attorney,
transferred the property out of Jason's hand. Jason's creditor argued that the transfer was
void because it was a fraudulent conveyance to avoid the claim of creditors. Id.

20

The Court held that the Larry's decision to title the land in his son's name to avoid
the Mississippi Tax Commission was fraudulent but that fraudulent conveyances may be
attacked "only by a party who is injured or damaged by the conveyance and neither a
stranger to the transaction who is neither a creditor nor a purchaser or otherwise affected
has no standing to maintain the action." Id. at 366. The Court held that: 'The creditors of
the resulting trustee [here, Jason] can obtain no interest in the property in question by
attaching it for his debts. . . The creditors of the payor [here, Larry], on the other hand,
can proceed against the property on the theory that their debtor is the equitable owner."
I d a t 369.
In this case, Larry's acts are analogous to John Nikols' acts as parents who titled
their land in their child's name. Jason's acts are analogous to Michael Nikols' acts as
children who retain bare legal title to their parents land but hold no equitable interest in
the property. Thus, as in Funderbunk, Michael Nikols' creditors can obtain no interest in
the four Murray properties by attaching it for his debts, just as Jason's creditors could
not. However, John Nikols' creditors could have proceeded against the four Murray
properties because he is the equitable owner, just as Larry's creditors could.
In conclusion, John Nikols established a resulting trust in his favor by showing he
intended to retain the beneficial interest in the property. The law is clear that any intent
to avoid his creditors when the resulting trust was created does not eliminate his current
equitable interest in the property - it only allows his creditors as of that time to pierce his
interest. As strangers to the original conveyance, Michael Nikols' creditors cannot reach
what is owned by his father.
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II.

THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING AN ADVERSE INFERENCE
AGAINST JOHN NIKOLS AFTER IT CONDITIONED MICHAEL
NIKOLS' TESTIMONY UPON A COMPLETE WAIVER OF HIS
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
The Court also erred in drawing an adverse inference against John Nikols based

upon Michael Nikols' failure to testify. The Court erroneously conditioned Michael's
testimony on a complete waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
in an unrelated criminal case. Mr. Chesnoff argued that Michael's invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right prevented him from impeaching Michael's credibility should he testify
about the resulting trust on the four Murray properties since Michael would not testify
about the drug charges pending against him. R. 2953: 142 (18-21). The Rules of
Evidence prohibited Mr. Chesnoff from impeaching Michael with the underlying facts of
the criminal charges. Mr. Chesnoff could have questioned Michael about his involvement
in the transfer of title and his father's intent without questioning him about his
involvement in drug dealing.
A.

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONDITIONED MICHAEL NIKOLS'
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE PROPERTIES' CONVEYANCE UPON A
COMPLETE WAIVER OF HIS PRIVILEVGE AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION.

The Court inappropriately required Michael Nikols to make a Hobson's choice at
the evidentiary hearing by holding it would not limit cross-examination to facts
surrounding the conveyance of title if Michael testified and invoked the Fifth
Amendment in response to questions relating to his pending criminal case and his
involvement with drugs. R. 2953: 120 (3-8). Nothing Mr. Chesnoff wanted to ask
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Michael Nikols was admissible. He wanted to cross examine Michael about the pending
drug trafficking charge in order to impeach his credibility.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that arrest without a conviction cannot be used
to impeach the witness's integrity. Michelson v. U.S., 69 S.Ct. 213, 222 (1948). "Arrest
without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair
the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty. Only a
conviction, therefore, may be inquired about to undermine the trustworthiness of a
witness." Id (distinguishing rule permitting cross-examination of character witness for
defendant as to arrest of defendant for other offenses from rule prohibiting crossexamination of witness as to arrest of witness himself).
The Supreme Court of Utah has likewise said that neither reason nor justice allow
questioning to adduce a fact that a witness has been charged with a certain crime. State v.
Dickinson, 361 P.2d 412 (Utah 1961). "The very purpose of excluding such evidence is
to prevent the prosecution from smearing an accused by showing a bad reputation and
relying on that for conviction rather than being required to produce adequate proof of the
crime in question." Id at 12; E.g., State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 526 (Utah 1983)
(internal citations omitted).5

Even if Michael Nikols had been convicted of drug dealing, impeaching evidence of a
prior conviction is restricted to the fact of the conviction and is not admissible to show
the details and events of the crime. State v. Hansen, 448 P.2d 720 (Utah 1968) (allowing
nature of crime to be elicited). Moreover, there is a split of authority among the courts as
to whether a prior conviction for drug dealing is relevant in assessing a witness's
credibility. Utah courts have not weighed in on the topic.
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Mr. Chesnoff also sought to cross examine Michael regarding his alleged
involvement in drug dealing and the facts underlying the charge of drug trafficking to
impeach his credibility. Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence state that specific
instances of conduct can be admitted to attack the witness' character for truthfulness if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Utah R. Evid. 608(b).
Allegations of past acts involving drugs are irrelevant to credibility in both civil
and criminal cases. Under Rule 608(b), cross examination is limited to specific instances
of misconduct clearly probative of truthfulness. For example, in an age discrimination
action, evidence that an employee who had brought the charge of sexual harassment had
used marijuana two or three years before the incident was inadmissible to impeach her
credibility since "illegal drug use or transactions, without more, do not show
untruthfulness." Crimm v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 750 F.2d 703 (8 th Cir. 1984). See also
Dennis v. State, 2008 WL 2744237, 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.). In deciding whether a
witness could be cross examined about whether he made a false statement regarding the
rental value of land at issue in a case resolving a decedent's trust, the Court of Appeals of
Arkansas incorporated an Arkansas Supreme Court ruling in a criminal case, which made
the distinction between conduct such as "false swearing, fraud, and swindling" (which do
relate to truthfulness) and conduct such as "murder, drug crimes, and assault" (which
ordinarily do not). Fair v. Henson, 84 S.W.3d 871 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) citing Rhodes v.
State, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982).
Utah appellate courts hold the same with respect to other narcotics offenses. See
State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984); State v. Martinez, 848 P. 2d 702 (Utah
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App. 1993). Conduct such as drug use is only admissible where is it serves the distinct
purpose of challenging the witness's ability to perceive and recall the events in question.
See Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788. It is not admissible to impeach the witness's character or
show his propensity toward untruthfulness. Id.
The Court could not logically infer that Michael's testimony would have been
adverse to his father's claim by his failure to testify. Even if Michael had testified
consistent with his proffer and deposition that the conveyance was not a gift and had
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions about drug trafficking,
the only inference the Court could reasonably make was that Michael Nikols was a drug
dealer. Michael's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination
does not logically support an inference that his testimony would have been inconsistent
with his father's testimony about the conveyance.
B.

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ASSIGNED AN ADVERSE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST JOHN NIKOLS FOR MICHAEL NIKOLS'
FAILURE TO TESTIFY.

The Court could not draw an adverse presumption against John Nikols for
Michael's failure to take the stand. Michael was available and willing to testify that the
conveyance was not a gift. He was prevented from taking the stand as a result of the
Court's error in conditioning his testimony on a waiver of his privilege against selfincrimination as discussed above. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against
John on the theory that he withheld relevant witness testimony.
John Nikols was not required to produce all accessible witnesses and may rest his
case on his testimony alone. Beardsley v. Suburban Coach Co., 83 Ga. App. 381, 391-92
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(Ga. Ct. App. 1951). For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held a purchase money
resulting trust was created for the parents where the father titled property in his
daughter's name even though the daughter's testimony was not admitted. Wilson, 286
S.W. 2d at 556. "Her conduct over the course of the years in permitting her father to have
complete control of the property is more persuasive than any words she could utter." Id.
Likewise, where a mother sought a constructive trust on her incompetent son's behalf the
Texas Court of Appeals found the defendant's invocation of their privilege was not the
sole basis for the judgment since she introduced checks drawn from her son's account in
the exact amount of his father's mortgage payment. Floumov v. Wilz, 201 S.W. 3d 833,
835-36 (Texas App. 2006).
The same is true in John Nikols' conveyance. It was unimportant for Michael
Nikols to testify because his conduct in the 20 years since the conveyance is more
persuasive than any testimony he could have given. John Nikols established a resulting
trust preventing Michael Nikols' creditors to reach John Nikols' properties.
Even if it were appropriate, the inference drawn from Michael's invocation of his
Fifth Amendment privilege was not probative proof of any essential facts of John Nikols'
case. The Court could not logically infer that Michael's testimony would have been
adverse to his father's claim by his failure to testify. Even if Michael had testified
consistent with his proffer and deposition that the conveyance was not a gift and had
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions about drug trafficking,
the only inference the Court could reasonably make was that Michael Nikols was a drug
dealer. Michael's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination
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does not logically support an inference that his testimony would have been inconsistent
with his father's testimony about the conveyance.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DRAWING AN ADVERSE
INFERENCE AGAINST JOHN NIKOLS WHEN APPELLEE CHESNOFF
DID NOT TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF HIS TWO CLAIMS: THAT HE
RELIED ON THE TITLE TO SECURE PAYMENT AND THAT JOHN WAS
ALSO A DEBTOR.
An adverse inference against John Nikols was inappropriate because it was not his

obligation to call Mr. Chesnoff so Mr. Chesnoff could rebut John's evidence. Mr.
Chesnoff raised two claims: that he relied on the title to secure payment and that John had
guaranteed Michael's fee and was also Chesnoff s debtor, despite acknowledging in his
affidavit that his fee agreement was not secured by any real properly or other collateral.
R. 18: f 4.
John Nikols and his counsel invited Mr. Chesnoff s relevant testimony about any
conversations between Mr. Chesnoff and John in support of his claims. However, at the
Evidentiary Hearing, counsel for Mr. Chesnoff repeatedly threatened to divulge
irrelevant, privileged attorney-client communications between him and Michael about
Michael's criminal case. At least three times Mr. Chesnoff s counsel told the Court that
Mr. Chesnoff would detail discussions he had with Michael about his distribution charges
despite its irrelevance in the case: first, " . . . I fully intend to question him about his
credibility and his involvement with drugs." R. 2953: 117 (2-7); second, "Now we want
to make this a question of what Mr. Chesnoff relied upon. And in doing so, you will put
— you will subject yourself to clear testimony that he dealt drugs and admitted to the
same." R. 2953: 129 (8-11); and third:
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"And I think that, if Mr. Michael Nikols would have answered truthfully and
admitted, as he did to Judge Cassell and others, that he was a drug dealer for
many, many years, and that's the case that goes up on appeal, that this resulting
trust was a concoction between an admitted drug dealer — major drug dealer —
and his father, that makes all the difference in the world in my case if I don't have
that. But the second prong of the resulting trust was an admitted long-time, head
drug kingpin drug dealer, then that prejudices me to a great extent." R. 2953: 155
(10-20).
The Court's adverse inference against John was error for four reasons: First, Mr.
Chesnoff could not have relied on the properties' bare title as a surety for his services;
second, Michael Nikols - not John Nikols - was Mr. Chesnoff s debtor; third, an adverse
inference against John Nikols is inappropriate where it was not John's obligation to
produce Mr. Chesnoff; and finally, Mr. Chesnoff could have established his claims
against John Nikols without violating his attorney-client privilege with Michael Nikols.
A. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED MR. CHESNOFF DID NOT RELY
ON THE PROPERTIES' TITLE AS A SURETY FOR HIS SERVICES.
Mr. Chesnoff failed to produce evidence that he relied on the properties' bare title
to secure the fee for his legal services to Michael. Indeed, he could not have reasonably
relied on bare title when he undertook Michael's representation in the criminal case.6 In
his affidavit in support of his complaint, Mr. Chesnoff states: "The parties retainer
agreement was not secured by real property or any other real collateral." R. 18: f 4.
In the indictment against Michael Nikols, the government claimed that the four
Murray properties currently at issue were subject to criminal forfeiture because they were
titled in Michael's name. Knowing that the properties were encumbered by a federal lis

The Court specifically asked Mr. Chesnoff if he had evidence he relied on the
properties' bare title, to which Mr. Chesnoff did not answer. R. 2953: 31 (7-10).
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pendens and subject to criminal forfeiture proceedings, Mr. Chesnoff could not have
reasonably relied on those properties to secure his fee. .. R. 421, Exhibit C: 19 (14-18);
R. 361: 6, (7-8); R. 2953: 131 (7-18).
Moreover, Mr. Chesnoff was aware of John's claim that he was the owner and
advocated that position in the federal court proceedings. On three separate occasions Mr.
Chesnoff, as an officer of the court, asserted that John Nikols paid the purchase price for
the four Murray properties and was the owner of the properties. First, during a Status
Hearing on September 29, 2005, Mr. Chesnoff told the Honorable Paul Cassell:
"We're confident, Your Honor, that when we proceed to trial you'll find out with
respect to monetary gain, none of these properties are in any way associated with
any kind of criminal activity, they are not - they were purchased in the '80s and
'90s, they have nothing to do with these activities, you'll see that, I make that
representation to you based on my investigation and the work we've done to
prepare for the trial."
R. 421, Exhibit C: 16 (13-21). Second, during Michael's Detention Hearing on October
6, 2005, Mr. Chesnoff told the Court that the four Murray properties did not belong to
Michael Nikols. "Every dime that Mr. Nikols has or his father as of this juncture, Your
Honor, is the result of good old fashioned hard work." R. 996, Exhibit 2: 23 (17-20).
"Unfortunately, Your Honor, we're not doing the forfeiture portion of the case at
this juncture, but I represent to you, Your Honor, that one of the strongest parts of
the defense of this Indictment is to the forfeitures. The properties that have been
seized were purchased by Mr. Nikols' father in the '80s and '90s. Now, I don't
think it's appropriate for the government, or most respectfully the court, to
extrapolate out that somehow Mr. Nikols had something to do with the purchases
of those properties because his father is prepared at the appropriate time to testify
as to how those properties were purchased, which is from money he earned
working every day as hard as he could in his restaurant business and other
ventures that were legitimate ventures." R.996, Exhibit 2: 23-24.
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Third, at the evidentiary hearing in the pending matter, Mr. Chesnoff s counsel
stated: "Michael's drug money was not used to acquire the Murray properties.. . John
bought the property. It wasn't purchased with the proceeds of drug money. Mr. Chesnoff
made certain of that." R. 2953: 140-41. Mr. Chesnoff could not have reasonably relied
on the bare title to the properties to secure his retainer when he told two different courts
on three separate occasions that Michael did not own them.
Even if Mr. Chesnoff s claim that he relied on bare title to secure his fee were
credible, reliance on bare title, without more, does not give rise to a creditor's complaint
against the owner of land titled in the debtor's name. The Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that where a husband held his wife's
property in trust for her, the husband's creditors did not have an equal or superior right to
the property than his wife. "It does not appear that any reliance on the fact that title was
in the name of the husband gave rise to any claim resulting from the judgment. From the
face of the complaint their rights are measured by whatever interest the husband had in
the property." Caldarola v. Caldarola, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 883, 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949).
B. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED JOHN NIKOLS WAS NOT MR.
CHESNOFF'S DEBTOR.
Mr. Chesnoff failed to present any evidence that John Nikols guaranteed
Michael's debt with John's four Murray properties. The retainer agreement is addressed
to Michael Nikols and is signed by Michael and David Chesnoff. R. 532, Attachment C.
No where on the document is John Nikols named and no other documents were executed.
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Utah code mandates that "every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another" is void unless it is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1953).
Mr. Chesnoff did not create a promissory note or a deed of trust securing the
properties, he titled his complaint to recover attorney fees against Michael Nikols and did
not name John Nikols as a responsible party, and he has made no other effort to collect
from John Nikols. Mr. Chesnoff even acknowledged in his affidavit to the Court that:
"The parties' retainer agreement was not secured by real property or any other real
collateral." R. 18: f 4.
If Mr. Chesnoff wanted a guaranty agreement subsequent to execution of his
retainer agreement, he should have either executed a separate document or at the very
least should have made explicit provisions in the fee agreement. Auto. Mfrs. Warehouse,
Inc. v. Serv. Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) ("had the parties wanted a
guaranty agreement on the open account they should have either executed a separate
document or at the very least they should have made explicit provisions therefor in the
other documents. The law requires that promises to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another be written").
Mr. Chesnoff s claim that John Nikols was his actual debtor also directly
contradicts the Court's own findings. The Court ordered a judgment against Michael
Nikols, determining there was no attorney-client relationship between John Nikols and
Mr. Chesnoff. The Court made four relevant findings: first, it found that Michael entered
into a retainer agreement with Mr. Chesnoff and agreed to pay $350,000 under that
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agreement and still owed $190,000 to Mr. Chesnoff; third, there was a dispute of
ownership regarding the properties and thus further discovery was required; fourth, there
was no attorney-client relationship between Chesnoff and John; and finally, the $200,000
settlement in lieu of the forfeiture "was against Michael only, and John was not obligated
to pay the $200,000 judgment, nor was he a party to the plea agreement" R. 1957:4-6.
Mr. Chesnoff s claims that his contract with Michael Nikols was guaranteed by John
Nikols are contrary to the Court's order and its reliance on the four corners of the fee
agreement.
Even if Mr. Chesnoff had evidence to show John Nikols was his actual debtor, that
evidence would be inadmissible. Parol evidence is generally inadmissible to modify
written terms of an integrated agreement. West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d
1058, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 866 P.2d
604, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal
agreements are merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract, and unless
fraud, accident or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the
parties and its terms cannot be altered by parol evidence." Lamb v. Bangart 525 P.2d
602, 607 (Utah 1974) (internal citations omitted); j ^ e also Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813
P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991) ("A court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after
careful consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain"). Mr. Chesnoff
argued in his Motion for Summary Judgment that it would be improper to allow parol
evidence that would change the terms of the agreement since its terms and conditions are
unambiguous. R.361: 12.
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No evidence supports Mr. Chesnoff s claim that John is also his debtor. He has
not produced any documents in support of his claim that John Nikols acted as a guarantor
for his son's retainer agreement, as is required under Utah code. A father's statement,
without more, that he will do his best to help pay his son's legal fees, does not create a
legal right of his son's debtor to seize his property. The fee agreement between Michael
Nikols and Mr. Chesnoff was far from a secure transaction entitling Mr. Chesnoff to land
owned by John Nikols.
C. AN ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST JOHN NIKOLS IS
INAPPROPRIATE WHERE IT WAS NOT JOHN'S OBLIGATION TO
CALL MR. CHESNOFF.
The Court erred in drawing an adverse inference against John Nikols for Mr.
Chesnoff s decision not to testify. For an adverse inference to apply, four factors must be
present: "(1) it appears that the documentary evidence exists or existed; (2) the
suppressing party has possession or control of the evidence; (3) the evidence is available
to the suppressing party, but not to the party seeking production; (4) it appears that there
has been actual suppression or withholding of evidence." Gilbert v. Costco, 989 F.2d 399,
406 (10th Cir. 1993) citing Evans v. Robbins, 897 F.2d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1990). The
inference is intended to punish parties who are withholding witness testimony - not to
penalize parties who do not have the power to produce witnesses to testify. Roth v. New
Hotel Monteleone, L.L.C.. 978 So. 2d 1008, 1012 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
For an adverse inference to arise from a party's failure to produce a witness, it
must find that witness was available and that the witness was one that the particular party
would naturally produce. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 81
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F.3d 1546, 1552 (10m Cir. 1996) (witness testimony out of party's control). It would not
be natural for John Nikols to call Mr. Chesnoff, his opposing party, to testify in
opposition to John's evidence. An adverse presumption against him was error.
John Nikols established his case before submitting it to Mr. Chesnoff s witnesses,
at which point Mr. Chesnoff chose not to testify. A sufficient showing that one other
than legal titleholder paid purchase price for property makes a prima facie case that
beneficial ownership rests in the payor. Hocking, 394 N.E. 2d at 657. The Court found
John met his burden but allowed the improper adverse inferences - and nothing more - to
eliminate John's prima facie showing:
"I'm troubled by the fact that it appears that, at least from one side of the
testimony, that John Nikols has invested his money in buying these properties and
that he's claimed that he's regarded them as his properties ... I mean, I don't — I
don't think that you win just by presenting the prima facie case."
R. 2953: 152-53. Contrary to the Court's ruling, when John Nikols met his burden, it was
Mr. Chesnoff s own obligation to rebut John's case. It is irrational to argue that one party
is obliged to produce its opposition's evidence.
It was Mr. Chesnoff- not John Nikols - who failed to testify in the face of
probative evidence. Any adverse inference in this case would have been more
appropriate against Mr. Chesnoff. The failure to testify impairs the value of one's
evidence and gives greater credence to the positive evidence of the other party. Stocker
v. Boston & M. R. R.. 151 A. 457, 458 (N. H. 1930). It does not, however, create
substantive proof of any claims. For example, when considering all the circumstances of
a case against a banker who did not testify in his defense, the Supreme Court of South
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Carolina upheld his loss based on the district court's adverse inference against him
because the opposing party's claims were supported by testimony and a number of
documents. South Orange Trust Co. v. Conner, 228 S.C. 218, 275 (1955); See also
FlournovT201 S.W. 3d at 837.
Mr. Chesnoff s produced no positive evidence in support of his claims. He did not
testify, although he could, regarding conversations he had with John Nikols and
conversations he had with his client, Michael Nikols, about his payment and the Nikols'
properties. His failure to testify impairs his own evidence and gives greater credence to
John's positive evidence. The Court inappropriately assigned an adverse inference
against John Nikols.
D. MR. CHESNOFF COULD HAVE ESTABLISHED HIS CLAIMS
AGAINST JOHN NIKOLS WITHOUT DISCLOSED PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MICHAEL NIKOLS.
Mr. Chesnoff could have testified about his conversations with John Nikols
without revealing privileged communications with his former client damaging to his
pending criminal case. Mr. Chesnoff s claim that he relied on the land's bare title to
secure payment did not require him to divulge information that "will not be good
testimony for Mike." R. 2953: 128.
The claim that John Nikols had guaranteed the fee agreement and was his actual
debtor hinged on statements made to him by John Nikols - not by Michael Nikols. John's
counsel made it clear that she did not oppose Mr. Chesnoff s relevant testimony. "I don't
have any problems at all having Mr. Chesnoff testify about representations that John
made. If that's what he wants to do and he feels that he needs to put that evidence on, I'm
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in no position to tell him not to." R. 2953, P.135, L.6-9. But Mr. Chesnoff repeatedly
threatened to divulge adverse privileged communications between Michael Nikols and
himself. Supra sources cited p.29.
Mr. Chesnoff relied on the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct as his authority
that Michael Nikols waived his entire attorney-client privilege when he sued Mr.
Chesnoff for malpractice. R. 2953: 121 (10-23). Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct states that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client, to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary,
"to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil clain
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client." Utah Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.6(b)(5).
The comment to the Rule States:
Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. . . In any
case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure
will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be
made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other
persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other
arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
Utah Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. 14.
The case in controversy was not between Michael and his attorney, Chesnoff.
Michael's malpractice claim had already been adjudicated. The case in controversy was
between Chesnoff and John Nikols. The claim that John Nikols guaranteed Michael's
legal fees was not based upon conduct in which Michael was involved in relation to his
defense to the criminal charges. The only reasonably necessary information Mr.
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Chesnoff could have revealed was regarding his source of payment. Mr. Chesnoff
asserted in Court that the source of revenues for the properties was not from drug money.
Nothing Mr. Chesnoff could testify about regarding his conversations with John Nikols
would have violated his ethical duty to Michael. This is especially true since Mr.
Chesnoff could not have reasonably believed his privileged communications with
Michael about his narcotics charge were relevant to representations made to him by John
Nikols regarding payment of the fees.
CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned arguments, Mr. John Nikols urges this Court to find
the Court erred in allowing Michael Nikols' creditor to seize his Properties.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 26th

day of September, 2008.
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 608

Cwest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*il Article VI. Witnesses
-4RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against selfincrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character
for truthfulness.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown
to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992;

November 1, 2004.]

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subdivisions (a) and (b) are the federal rule, verbatim, and are comparable to
Rules 22 and 6, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), except to the extent that
Subdivision (a) limits such evidence to credibility for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) allowed a broader attack
on the character of a witness as to truth, honesty and integrity.
This rule should be read in conjunction with Rule 405. Subdivision (b) allows, in
the discretion of the court on cross-examination, inquiry into specific instances
of the witness's conduct relative to his character for truthfulness or
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untruthfulness or specific instances of conduct of a person as to whom the witness
has provided character testimony. See, State
v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d
1191 (1971). Attack upon a witness's credibility by specific instances of
character other than conviction of a crime is inadmissible under current Utah law.
Cf. Bullock
v. Ungricht,
538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975); Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). Allowing cross-examination of a witness as to specific instances affecting
character for truthfulness is new to Utah practice and in accord with the decision
in Michelson
v. United
States,
335 U.S. 469 (1948). The cross-examination of a
character witness as to specific instances of conduct which the character witness
may have heard about concerning the person whose character is placed in evidence
has been sanctioned by a prior decision, State v. Watts,
639 P 2d 158 (Utah 1981).
The rule is subject to a witness invoking the statutory privilege against
degradation contained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-24-9 (1953). See, In
Peterson,
15 Utah 2d 27, 386 P.2d 726 (1963). The privilege, however, may be
subject to limitation to accommodate an accused's right of confrontation. Cf.
Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974).

re

Subdivision (c) is Rule 608(c), Military Rules of Evidence, verbatim.
[The 2004] amendment [to (b)] is in order to be consistent with changes made to the
Federal Rule.

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Addendum B

Page I
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609

Cwest's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*S Article VI, Witnesses
^RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General Rule.

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,

(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time Limit.
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
However, evidence of
a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless
the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of
intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation.
Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and
that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess
of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence.

(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult
and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.
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[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah law by granting the court
discretion in convictions not involving dishonesty or false statement to refuse to
admit the evidence if it would be prejudicial to the defendant. Current Utah law
mandates the admission of such evidence. State
v. Bennett,
30 Utah 2d 343, 517
P.2d 1029 (1973) ; State
v. Van Dam, 554 pT~2d 1324 (Utah 1976); State
v.
McCumber,
622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).
There is presently no provision in Utah law similar to Subsection (d).
The pendency of an appeal does not render a conviction inadmissible. This is in
accord with Utah case law. State
v. Crawford,
60 Utah 6, 206 P. 717 (1922).
This rule is identical to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 1990
amendments to the federal rule made two changes in the rule. The comment to the
federal rule accurately reflects the Committee's view of the purpose of the
amendments.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 25, Fraud
*il Chapter 5. Statute of Frauds
-t§ 25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with
the agreement:
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year
from the making of the agreement;
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscairriage of another;
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out
of his own estate;
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation; and
(f) every credit agreement.
(2)(a) As used in Subsecti on (1)(f) and this Subsection (2):
(i)(A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution to:
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or
things in action;
(II) otherwise extend credit;

or

(III) make any other financial accommodation.
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary agreements
related to deposit accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a
financial accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives
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a financial accommodation, under a credit agreement with a financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means:
(A) a state or federally chartered:
(I) bank;
(II) savings and loan association;
(III) savings bank;
(IV) industrial bank;
(V) credit union;

or

or

(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act.
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2) (e) , a debtor or a creditor may not
maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement:
(A) is in writing;
(B) expresses consideration;
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions;

and

(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agreement would be
sought.
(ii) For purposes of this act, a signed application constitutes a signed agreement, if the creditor does not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement from the debtor when granting the application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a credit agreement is
created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor;

or

(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary
or other business relationships.
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated typewritten or printed
provision giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of the agreement between the creditor and debtor and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral agreement. The pro-
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vision does not have to be on the promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by the
party to be charged if:
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the agreement;
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute
acceptance of those terms; and
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor, requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the credit offered.
Laws 1909, c. 72, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 257, § 1; Laws 1996, c. 182, § 24, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 2004, c. 92, § 24, eff. March 17, 2004.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2467; C.L. 1907, § 2467;
1933, § 33-5-4;
C. 1943, § 33-5-4.

C.L. 1917, § 5817;

R.S.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2004, c. 92, rewrote this section that formerly provided:
"The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement:
11

(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from
the making of the agreement;
"(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
"(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage,
except mutual promises to marry;
"(4) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of
his own estate;
11

(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation;
"(6) every credit agreement.
"(a) As used in Subsection (6):
"(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution to lend,
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Owest's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice
*B Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos)
*il Client-lawyer Relationship
-•RULE 1.6. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted
by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(b)(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(b)(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud and in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(b)(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(b)(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved,
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(b)(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
(c) For purposes of this rule, representation of a client includes counseling a
lawyer about the need for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or
psychological or emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving on an
Utah State Bar endorsed lawyer assistance program.
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.]
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COMMENT
[1] This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the
representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See
Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the
lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal
information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and
Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such
information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.
[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the
absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information
relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed
consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer
relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client
effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful
conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine
their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be
legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients
follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related
bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine and the
rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in
which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence
concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the
representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a
lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably
lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a
hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so
long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to
ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.
Authorized Disclosure
[5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances
limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a
client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In some situations,
for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot
properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory
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conclusion to the matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's
practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm,
unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to
specified lawyers.
Disclosure Adverse to Client
[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring
lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited
exceptions. Paragraph (b) (1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical
integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it
will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a
person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action
necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has
accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this
information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a
person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating
disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce
the number of victims.
[7] Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that
permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected
persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or
fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. The
client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful
conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal the
client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with
respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of
the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c) which permits the lawyer, where
the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation
in limited circumstances.
[8] Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of
the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the
client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the
wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the
affected person can be prevented, rectified or mitigated. In such situations, the
lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent
necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain
losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b)(3) does not apply when
a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for
representation concerning that offense.
[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing
confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with
these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will
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be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when
the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such
disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
[10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in
a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of
the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim
involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise
in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong
allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a
third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer
and client acting together.
The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been
made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an
action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be
established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion.
The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.
[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the
services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses
the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it
to the detriment of the fiduciary.
[12] Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client.
Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of
these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears
to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to
the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule
and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such
disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.
[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation
of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming
authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent
of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all
nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the
information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must
consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by
Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to
comply with the court's order.
[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified.
Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take
suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in
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connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner
that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a
need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be
sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
[15] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information
relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by this
Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's
relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the
lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the
conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph
(b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other
rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by
paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other
hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such
disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality
[16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the
representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the
lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client
or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules l.L, 5.1 and 5.3.
[17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the
representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent
the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty,
however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the
method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special
circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality
include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of
the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client
may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this
Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would
otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.
Former Client
[18] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has
terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against
using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.
[19] Paragraph (c) is an addition to ABA Model Rule 1.6 and provides for
confidentiality of information between lawyers providing assistance to other
lawyers under an Utah State Bar endorsed lawyer assistance program.
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